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Court finds no manufacturer liability in child's death
By Bryan M. Sims
In Todd v. Societe BIC, S.A., 21
F.3d 1402 (7th Cir. 1994), the
Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a disposable
lighter manufactured by Bic
Corporation (Bic) was not unreason-
ably dangerous as to require
imposing strict liability upon its
manufacturer. It further held that for
product liability analysis, Illinois
law dictates the use of the consumer
contemplation test, which examines
the expectation of the "ordinary
consumer." In so ruling, the court
narrowed the scope of liability for a
manufacturer by eliminating the use
of the risk utility test in cases where
the product design is simple and the
danger obvious.
Fire claims a child's life
In March 1988, Cori Smith, age
four, obtained a lighter belonging to
one of the adult smokers in a home
shared by the Smith and Todd
families. Although Cori started a
small fire in her parents' bedroom,
the flames were extinguished before
any damage was sustained.
Following this incident, the
adults in the household warned Cori,
as well as the other five children in
the house, about the dangers of
playing with matches and lighters.
However, on the morning of March
27, 1988, Cori found a Bic lighter
on a table in the living room. She set
fire to some papers which were on
the floor of the bedroom where
twenty-two month old Tiffany Todd
slept. The adults, who had been
asleep, did not awaken in time to
prevent the fire from spreading.
Tiffany died in the blaze.
Rodney Todd, Sr., Tiffany's
father and administrator of her
estate, brought suit against Bic in a
diversity action in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. In his complaint, Todd
alleged that Bic was negligent and
strictly liable for selling a defective
product. He claimed that the lighter
was unreasonably dangerous
because it lacked a child-resistant
feature and failed to provide
adequate warning of potential
dangers. The disputed warning read
"KEEP OUT OF THE REACH OF
CHILDREN."
The District Court granted
summary judgment for Bic. It found
that the lighter was not defective
because it provided the small flame
it was intended to provide. More-
over, the court held that the
manufacturer's warning was
adequate. It also dismissed Todd's
public policy arguments for holding
Bic strictly liable, stating that
"public policy only requires holding
manufacturers and sellers liable if
their product is found to be defective
or unreasonably dangerous." Todd
subsequently appealed to the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals.
On review, a divided appellate
panel reversed the District Court's
grant of summary judgment for the
defendant. The full circuit court
subsequently vacated that order,
reheard the case en banc, and
unanimously agreed that the
warning on the lighter was adequate.
Additionally, it also certified two
questions of state law to the Illinois
Supreme Court: (1) whether the
court must consider the "foreseeable
user" under the consumer contem-
plation test; and (2) whether the
risk-utility test was applicable.
However, the Illinois Supreme Court
declined certification. In light of the
Illinois court's silence, the Seventh
Circuit looked to other persuasive
authority to properly interpret
Illinois law on these issues.
Lighters not too dangerous
On appeal, Todd first contended
that Bic was strictly liable for
damages because the lighter it
manufactured was unreasonably
dangerous under the consumer
contemplation test. According to the
consumer contemplation test, a
product is unreasonably dangerous if
it is dangerous beyond that which is
contemplated by the ordinary
consumer. If the product is used
properly and it fails to perform in its
expected manner, a manufacturer
may be held strictly liable for the
resulting injuries.
After its review, the Seventh
Circuit held that the disputed lighter
performed exactly as expected. The
court noted that the ordinary
consumer would anticipate that,
when used correctly, the Bic lighter
would produce a small flame.
Additionally, the ordinary consumer
would predict that when the small
flame is placed in contact with a
combustible material, such as paper,
a larger flame would be produced.
The court concluded that while a
lighter may be dangerous because it
can start a fire, it is not dangerous to
the extent of being unreasonable.
Therefore, the Circuit Court held
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that since the lighter performed in a
manner consistent with the expecta-
tion of the ordinary consumer, it was
not unreasonably dangerous and Bic
was not strictly liable.
Todd next argued that the
consumer contemplation test should
consider the expectation of the
foreseeable user, instead of only the
ordinary consumer. For purposes of
the appeal, Bic had conceded that
children were foreseeable users of
its lighter. Therefore, Todd con-
tended that the court improperly
granted summary judgment because
it failed to include children in its
consumer contemplation test
analysis.
Turning to this issue, the Circuit
Court declared that Illinois law
clearly indicates that the applicable
standard in the consumer contempla-
tion test is the expectation of the
ordinary consumer. The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that children,
unlike ordinary consumers, do not
possess the knowledge common to
the community, and as a result, their
expectations are inappropriate for
consideration in the consumer
contemplation test. In addition, the
court warned that allowing such a
standard would result in absolute
liability for manufacturers because
children do not perceive the dangers
that are inherent in every product.
For these reasons, the court con-
cluded that it is inappropriate to
consider the expectations of the
foreseeable user in the consumer
contemplation test.
Test not always applicable
Todd then argued that the district
court's failure to consider the risk-
utility test, in addition to the
consumer contemplation test,
mandated reversal of the summary
judgment. He insisted that the
lighter might be unreasonably
dangerous under either test. Under
the risk-utility test, a product is
unreasonably dangerous, even when
it meets consumer expectations, if:
(1) the defective design is exces-
sively dangerous and preventable;
and (2) the risk of danger in the
design outweighs the benefits.
The Seventh Circuit observed
that, in certain cases, the Illinois
Supreme Court has adopted the
risk-utility test. However, in such
situations, the product in contro-
versy was complex and the risk it
presented was not obvious. In the
case at hand, it found the lighter was
a simple and obviously dangerous
product. The Circuit Court held that
the risk-utility test would not apply
to a simple but obviously dangerous
product because it was unlikely that
the Illinois Supreme Court would
apply the test to such a product.
The Circuit Court then addressed
two final issues: (1) whether the
warning was adequate; and (2)
whether the manufacturer was
negligent. It affirmed the District
Court's holding that the warning
was adequate. The court also found
that Bic was not negligent because
the product was not unreasonably
dangerous. Therefore, Bic did not
breach its duty to produce a reason-
ably safe product. In so finding, the
Circuit Court concluded that an
ordinary disposable cigarette lighter
is not unreasonably dangerous so as
to warrant holding its manufacturer
negligent or strictly liable.
Please see "Lighter liability" on page 38
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act awards limited
By Judith Gorske
In Wright v. Finance Serv. of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F3d
647 (6th Cir. 1994), the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the executor of a decedent's estate
had standing to sue a debt collection agency under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692 to 1692o, for violations involving letters sent
by the agency to the decedent. The court also held that
Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) of the FDCPA limits additional
damages to $1,000 per proceeding.
Gladys Finch died in October, 1989. After her death,
Finance Service of Norwalk (Finance Service), a debt-
collection agency, sent Finch 14 letters attempting to
collect $112 for an allegedly overdue medical bill.
Betty Wright, acting as executor for the estate, notified
Finance Service of Finch's death. The agency then
discontinued its correspondence.
Wright then filed a complaint against Finance
Service in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, alleging a total of 30 FDCPA violations
contained within the 14 letters Finance Service had sent
Finch. Subsequently, both parties moved for partial
summary judgment. Wright sought partial summary
judgment on the issue of the 30 alleged FDCPA viola-
tions. Finance Service moved for partial summary
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judgment on the issue of Wright's standing to bring suit
on Finch's behalf. In addition, Finance Service sought a
ruling in limine limiting Wright's recovery to $1,000 for
damages in excess of actual losses, costs, and fees.
In ruling on the motions, the District Court partially
granted Wright's motion for summary judgment,
finding Finance Service liable for 14 FDCPA violations.
It denied Finance Service's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of Wright's standing, allowing
her to bring suit on behalf of Finch's estate. Finally, the
court granted Finance Service's motion in limine, and
limited additional damages to $1,000 per proceeding.
Wright appealed the District Court's decision
limiting her damages to the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, contending that she was entitled to collect
$1,000 for each separate FDCPA violation. Finance
Service, in turn, cross-appealed the district court's
determination that Wright had standing to bring the suit.
A divided panel of the appellate court affirmed Wright's
standing to bring suit on behalf of the decedent's estate,
but reversed the lower court's decision limiting addi-
tional damages. The panel's decision was vacated and a
rehearing en banc was granted by order.
Executor may sue debt collection agency
The Sixth Circuit initially addressed the issue of
whether Wright had standing to bring suit on behalf of
Finch's estate. In its analysis, the court turned to the
statutory language in question. Specifically, it focused
on 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a), which provides that "any debt
collector who fails to comply with any provision.. .with
respect to any person is liable to such person." The
Circuit Court determined that the phrase "with respect
to any person" included persons such as Wright, who
"stand in the shoes of the debtor." Moreover, the court
noted that 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e) prohibited a debt
collector from using "any false, deceptive, or mislead-
ing misrepresentation.. .in connection with the collec-
tion of any debt." It recognized that this provision could
be violated even if a debt collection practice did not
offend the alleged debtor herself. Taking the plain
language of the FDCPA, together with its stated purpose
and legislative history, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
District Court's ruling on the issue of standing. In so
doing, it held that Wright, as the executor of the estate,
was entitled to bring suit for the FDCPA violations.
Additional damages limited to $1,000
The Circuit Court then turned its attention to the
issue of whether additional damages should be limited
to $1,000 per proceeding rather than per violation. It
first examined the language of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(a)(2)(A), which states that additional damages
may not exceed $1,000 "in the case of any action by
any individual." The court found nothing in the plain
statutory language, legislative history, or other sections
of the FDCPA to suggest that Congress intended to limit
additional damages to $1,000 per violation rather than
per proceeding.
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit noted that Section
1692k(a)(2)(A) required the court to consider the
frequency and persistence of noncompliance in any
action. According to the court, this requirement
reflected Congress' anticipation of repeated violations
as the subject of a single action or proceeding. The
Circuit Court also found support for this statutory
interpretation in Section 1692k(a)(2)(B), which limits
the amount of additional damages in class actions to
"the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth
of the debt collector." In conclusion, the court declared
that it would be incongruous to provide a limitation on
class actions without a corresponding cap on individual
recovery of damages. The discrepancy would permit an
individual plaintiff to "recover more in damages than a
similarly situated plaintiff representing a class of
claimants."
Although limiting a plaintiff's additional damages to
$1,000 per proceeding, rather than per violation,
appears to minimize the statute's deterrent value in
preventing debt collection abuses, the court observed
that other provisions in the statute acted as sufficient
deterrence. For example, provisions such as Sections
1692(a)(1) and 1692(a)(3)allow a plaintiff to recover
actual damages, court costs, and attorney's fees in their
entirety. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that
Wright's recovery for additional damages was limited
to $1,000 per proceeding, rather than $1,000 per
violation.
Disagreement over entitlement to sue
Judge Kennedy delivered a separate opinion. While
he concurred with the decision limiting recovery for
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